The most commonly repeated phrase in police drama television shows or movies from police officers prior to or after affecting an arrest is “you have the right to remain silent. You have the right to an attorney…� These statements are part of the “ or Warnings� which derives from that protects an individual against self-incrimination which reads:

“nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law�

The Miranda Rights are warnings that are given by law enforcement personnel to individuals in police custody but prior to arrest, arrested but prior to questioning, during arrest while questioning and after arrest along with post arrest questioning. The manner in which Miranda Rights are depicted in police drama television shows or movies mislead the public.

While the phrases “you have the right to remain silent� and “you have a right to an attorney� is often heard, most citizens do not have a clear understanding of how those statements relate to the Miranda Rights, as well as the interplay of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the . A common misconception is that the Miranda Rights must be read to each and every person arrested. That is not legally correct. The police must give a person their Miranda Rights only if the person is in police custody and they intend to question such person about their alleged crimes. Remember, there are three levels of police questioning, they are: common law right of inquiry, stop and question (sometimes frisk) and Miranda Rights.

Under the Common Right of Inquiry, an exception to the , the police can ask you basic questions such as name, address, and the nature of your conduct. However, the police cannot use physical force to forcibly stop such individual and that individual has an absolute right to walk away without answering the officer’s questions. This is generally true throughout the country. Under , aka Stop, Question and Frisk (New York Criminal Procedure Law 140.50), and exception to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the police can use physical force to forcibly stop and question such an individual about the nature of their conduct that they reasonably suspect is about to commit, has committed or is committing any felony or misdemeanor in the New York State Penal Law. The person can be detained for a “reasonable period of time� and is not free to leave. Depending upon the brief investigation, the person may be released or arrested. The issues surrounding Stop and Question are complex, not for this blog discussion but, will be addressed in a separate blog discussion. Finally, the Miranda Rights are warnings that are given by law enforcement personnel to individuals in police custody but prior to arrest, arrested but prior to questioning, during arrest while questioning and after arrest along with post arrest questioning. Both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution are applicable. It is important to note, that an individual who is in police custody MUST refuse to answer questions and request legal counsel for all of the protections to apply.

Over the years, there have been several court decisions that focused on when and if Miranda even applies. Some courts have allowed statements to be used against an individual prior to being read his Miranda rights and prior to a request for counsel. But, with a recent Supreme , , the Court ruled that individuals in police custody that answer questions then suddenly remain silent essentially waives their Miranda Rights. In other words, silence is a statement of guilt. Now, that is a very scary proposition indeed.

In this case, Genovevo Salinas of Houston, the police requested him to voluntarily come to the police station. Once he arrived at the police station, he was questioned about the double murder of two brothers with whom he had been seen with the night before. He was not in police “custody.â€� Hmm, we will save that one for later. Anyway, Salinas “voluntarilyâ€� answered police questioning for about an hour. Prior to his questioning, he was not read his Miranda Rights. Later in the questioning, the police asked him about some shotgun shells found at the murder scene. They asked him, if they performed Ballistic Tests on the shotgun shells, would they match his shotgun, Salinas remained silent. Based upon his silence, and a subsequent Ballistic match, Salinas was charged with murder, tried, and convicted in part by the court allowing the prosecutor to use his silence on some pre-arrest questions as evidence of his guilt. Salinas appealed on the grounds that his pre-arrest silence should not be admitted as evidence against him because the questioning and alleged statement (silence) violated the of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. On appeal, two state appellate courts upheld the murder conviction. One court citing a previous decision written by John Paul Stevens who reasoned that the Fifth Amendment is “simply irrelevant to a citizen’s decision to remain silent when he is under no official compulsion to speak.â€�

The Supreme Court granted Salinas’s petition for writ of certiorari (a document which a losing party files with the Supreme Court asking court to review the decision of a lower court). However, the Court upheld Salinas’s murder conviction ruling “that before petitioner could rely on the privilege against self- incrimination, he was required to invoke it. Because he failed to do so, the judgment of the is affirmed.�

The Court’s decision now makes it absolutely necessary for individuals who find themselves in a pre-arrest, pre-Miranda situation to specifically state that they wish to invoke their right to remain silent and request legal counsel, failure to do so, will result in silence being used as evidence of guilt.

Quite frankly, my personal view is that the Court upheld the unlawful custodial questioning of Salinas because other evidence connected him to the crime. If you review prior Supreme Court precedent, this decision makes no logical sense.

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The guarantees the freedom of speech whereas it states:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.�

Over the years, the has struggled to determine exactly what constitutes protected speech. Some jurists believe that freedom of speech is unconditional while others believe that the places limitations on speech under certain conditions. The prevailing thought is the latter; whereas it grants a person the right not to speak. For example, declining to salute the flag of the United States as in the case of , 319 U.S. 624 (1943) or to engage in symbolic speech like flag burning as in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).

In 1989, the United States Congress passed the Flag Protection Act (18 USC § 700) which reads: “Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.� There were several challenges to this act two of the seminal cases are Texas v. Johnson and United States v. Eichman. In both cases, the actors set fire to the United States Flag as a form of protest. The question posed to the United States Supreme Court: Whether or not the First Amendment right of free speech protected their actions? The Court ruled that flag burning is considered protected speech under the First Amendment.

The Court has also been called upon to decide what is not protected speech such as inciting actions that would harm others (yelling ‘fire’ in a crowded movie theater), students making obscene speech during school sponsored events, Bethel School District #43 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), or to print articles in a school newspaper over the objections of the school administration, , 484 U.S. 260 (1988).

In , Fraser a male student, gave a speech during a public assembly where he nominated another male student, used an “elaborate, graphic and explicit sexual metaphorâ€� aka “Double entendresâ€� which means that he used words capable of two meanings: (1) obvious interpretations (2) subtle interpretation usually sexually suggestive to describe him. Fraser’s speech was as follows:
“I know a man who is firm – he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character is firm – but most [of] all, his belief in you the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts – he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally – he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end – even the climax, for each and every one of you. So please vote for Jeff Kuhlman, as he’ll never come [long pause] between us and the best our school can be. He is firm enough to give it everything.”

Fraser was suspended for two days and the father filed a lawsuit in federal District Court alleging violates of Fraser’s First Amendment right to free speech. The Court ruled in favor of Fraser. Bethel appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision in favor of Fraser. Bethel appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled, however, that it was appropriate for the school to prohibit the use of obscene and offensive language. Chief Justice Warren Burger concluded that the First Amendment did not prohibit schools from prohibiting vulgar and lewd speech and “it was perfectly appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the “fundamental values” of public school education.â€�

In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, journalism students in were in the process of publishing a school-sponsored newspaper. One issue featured stories on teen pregnancy and divorce. The school’s principal thought the stories were inappropriate and prior to the publication, he deleted the two pages containing the stories without informing the journalism students. The students were upset because they had not been given the opportunity to make changes. The students felt their First Amendment rights had been violated, they filed suit in the . The Court sided with the school, ruling that the school had the authority to remove and regulate speech they deemed appropriate. The students appealed the decision to the . The appeals court reversed the lower court, finding that the paper was a “public forum” and that school officials could censor its content only under extreme circumstances. The school appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court and reversed the appellate court decision ruling that a school does not have to allow student speech if it is inconsistent with the schools’ educational policy.

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protects individuals against private property from being taken without just compensation. This typically occurs with real property. Although controversial, it has been deemed constitutional for state governments to have wide latitude, essentially unfettered freedom to regulate land usage. In a landmark case, the upheld zoning regulations in the case of the , 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

In this case, the Court ruled that it was not an unreasonable intrusion into private property rights by governments to restrict land usage because governments had a valid interest in regulating land usage to preserve or maintain the character of an area or neighborhood. With the Euclid case some believed that zoning was an unreasonable intrusion into private property but the case made state zoning ordinances constitutional with many states enacting zoning regulations and land use permits since the decision.

Although there have been many challenges to the Euclid case in attempts to have it overturned, the Court has consistently upheld its decision. However, the question becomes: When does a government regulating land usage become an unconstitutional taking? The Supreme Court faced this very question in two other landmark cases and .

In those cases, the government granted land use permits on the condition that the landowners relinquish certain interests in real property. The Court held in these cases that the conditions imposed for approval of the permits went beyond land use regulations but rose to the level of extortion. As a result, the Court tailored two requirements to ensure that the conditions set for permits were connected to legitimate state interests: essential nexus and rough proportionality. There must be a nexus or relation to the permit and the proposed land usage.

The issue of land use permits was revisited in the landmark case of Koontz v. St. John’s River Management. In this case, Coy A. Koontz, Sr. and his spouse had purchased land in and over the years the county had enacted legislation that substantially impacted their real property. He eventually sought to develop about four acres of his land which comprised of a mixture of forested and herbaceous wetlands, but state regulations required that he obtain certain wetlands dredging permit from the St. John’s River Water Management District, an agency authorized to apply conditions to the permits to ensure that any construction is not harmful to the water resources of the district.

The District would only allow development of his land if Koontz agreed to make cash payments for improvements to unrelated district property miles away. Koontz refused as he already agreed to donate eleven acres he was not planning to develop, thus his permit was denied.

He filed suit in Florida State Court alleging that the District’s action of denying his land use permit was an “unconstitutional taking� of his property violating the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court sided with Koontz; however, the District appealed the decision but eventually approved his permit. In a separate trial, Koontz was awarded money for the temporary taking of his land.

The appeals court upheld the Florida State but the District appealed to the , which overturned the appellate court ruling. The United States Supreme Court granted Koontz’s certiorari to review whether or not Nollan-Dolan requirements for land-use applied to a situation where: (1) the permit applications were denied, not granted subject to conditions and (2) the permit conditions proposed by the government to not require the landowner to relinquish property.

The Court held in its decision that the Nollan-Dolan requirements should apply even when the government denies a permit or demands money.

How this decision affects government land-use permit remains to been seen but as a joint statement released by the St. John’s River Water Management District and succinctly stated it “clarified the constitutional protections that must be afforded to landowners when governmental entities issue permits affecting protected property interests.�

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In the workplace, there are several federal laws such as that protect employees’ from . Under Title VII, the employer is responsible for ensuring that the law is followed. in the workplace is determined upon the legal status of the alleged harasser. For example, the employer would be liable if it was negligent in controlling working conditions thus creating the opportunity for a co-worker to harass another employee. In cases where the alleged harasser is a ‘supervisor’ then different rules would apply.

Until the settled the question of who is a ‘supervisor,’ various District and Circuit Courts could not agree on the legal standard. Before Vance, the legal theory of vicarious liability imputed to the employer for the purposes of discrimination claims under Tile VII holds that the supervisor must be in the position to hire, fire, promote, demote, transfer, or discipline an employee. The (EEOC) cited a broader definition to include those employees that hold a day-to-day supervisory authority. Vance clarifies and limits the definition of supervisor.

In this case, the petitioner Maetta Vance, an African- woman, sued her employer (BSU) alleging that a fellow employee, Saundra Davis, whom Vance considered a supervisor, created a hostile environment by using racial slurs, and physically accosted Vance in an elevator.
The petitioner filed a complaint with BSU and the EEOC. During the investigatory process, BSU took some corrective action, warning other employees’ that racial harassment would not be tolerated in the workplace. But the continued, therefore, Vance filed a federal lawsuit.

Under Title VII, to prevail on claims related to co-worker workplace harassment, the plaintiff must prove that the employer is negligent in responding to complaints about harassment; however, to prevail on claims related to workplace harassment by a ‘supervisor’ the employer does not have to be negligent because Title VII imputes the supervisor’s acts to the employer. Vance asserted that Davis was a ‘supervisor’ although BSU claimed Davis was not actually Vance’s supervisor. The District Court and the determined that Davis was not Vance’s ‘supervisor’ because Davis did not have the power to direct the terms and conditions of Vance’s employment. Additionally, both courts found that BSU had an adequate system in place for reporting and investigating claims of workplace harassment under Title VII, therefore, BSU could not be negligent.

The United States Supreme Court was presented with the following questions: Whether or not an employee or co-worker who has been given the authority to oversee the daily work of another worker can be considered a ‘supervisor’ for the purpose of determining employer liability for workplace harassment?

Ultimately the Court ruled in favor of BSU holding that an employer may be vicariously liable for an employee’s unlawful workplace harassment only when the employer has “empowered that employee to take tangible employment actions against the victim, i.e., to effect a “significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.� We reject the nebulous definition of a “supervisor� advocated in the EEOC Guidance…�

This landmark decision clarified the definition of a ‘supervisor’ for the purpose of determining liability for workplace discrimination claims but, does not change the employers obligation to provide a work environment that is free from workplace harassment, investigate and remedy any such claims, and constantly monitor the workplace for such behaviors that may be exhibited or demonstrated by their employees.

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Historically, African-Americans have been subjected to racial discrimination throughout society. One of the more problematic areas of racial discrimination involves African-Americans traveling throughout the in various interstate and transportation facilities. Historically, African-Americans were treated as second-class citizens being segregated from traveling with . Over the years, African-Americans have sought redress of these problems through the federal courts. The seminal case that illustrates this problem is Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962).

In this case, were provided segregated services from the White Americans in interstate and intrastate transportation facilities. The Black Americans alleged that providing such segregated services violates the which reads:
“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.�

The Black Americans alleged that such rights had been denied under color of state statutes, municipal ordinances, and state custom and usage. Based upon the foregoing, their rights of equality under the United States Constitution were violated. This civil rights action was brought in a district court seeking injunctive relief enforcing their civil rights.

The refused to hear the matter stating that Black Americans have no standing to enjoin criminal prosecutions under Mississippi’s breach of peace statutes because they do not allege that that they were prosecuted or threatened with prosecution and since not State may require it is foreclosed as a litigable issue. They appealed directly to the . The United States Constitution disagreed with the District Court’s position.

The United States Supreme Court ruled that although the appellants are not direct victims of racial discrimination, as passengers utilizing the segregated services of interstate and intrastate transportation facilities they have an absolute right to join this civil rights action. Further, the Court ruled that it cannot foreclose cases filed with respect to such important legal questions. The Court would have to interpret and if needed implement the Constitutional provisions in such instances. The Court has the authority to direct the matter for adjudication to the appropriate court. In this case, the Court directed the matter to be adjudicated by very same District Court that refused to hear the matter in the first instance.

On remand, after openly defying court orders, and subsequent action by the , the segregated interstate and intrastate transportation facilities along with any indicia of their existence were finally removed.

If your rights to freely travel throughout interstate and intrastate transportation facilities are being violated contact ¸£Àû¼§. in New York. We will review your claims thoroughly, providing you with an outline of possible actions you may wish to take. We are ready to be your voice for justice.

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Historically, have been subjected to racial discrimination throughout society. One of the more problematic areas of racial discrimination involved the sale and rental of property. Historically, refused to either sell or rent property to African Americans. Over the years, African-Americans have sought redress of these problems through the federal courts. The seminal case that illustrates this problem is Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).

In this case, Mr. Joseph Lee Jones was not allowed to buy property from a White American due to his race. Mr. Jones filed a complaint before the against Alfred H. Mayer Co. praying for injunctive relief. Mr. Jones alleged in the complaint that the racial discrimination preventing him from buying property is violative of 42 § 1982 which reads:

“All citizens of the shall have the same right, in every , as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.�

The District Court dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals held that Section 1982 is applicable only to state owned/managed properties and not to private individuals selling their private properties. The ruled in Mr. Jones’s favor.

The United States Supreme Court ruled that Section 1982 is applicable to all kinds of racial discrimination in the sale and rental of properties whether the property is state owned/managed or owned by private individuals. The Court also ruled that Section 1982 was enacted with the intention to grant legal rights to Black Americans to buy and rent properties without restriction. The Court further ruled that Section 1982 is in line with the reading of the , which reads:

“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.�

The Court determined that depriving Blacks from buying properties from White Americans is analogous to continuing with the vestiges of slavery in direct conflict with the Congressional intent which was to abolish slavery and eradicate its existence from society. Moreover, the Court determined that removing the hurdles for Blacks to own properties is entirely consistent with the Congressional intent as legislated in Section 1982.
If your rights to sell and rent real and personal property are being violated contact ¸£Àû¼§. in New York. We will review your claims thoroughly, providing you with an outline of possible actions you may wish to take. We are ready to be your voice for justice.

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The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was an important piece of legislation that was enacted to outlaw discriminatory voting practices that some Southern states allowed after the end of the Reconstruction Era. These States wrote new legislation that were designed to deny Blacks the right to vote by using literacy test, poll taxes, grandfather clauses as well as violence and intimidation. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 established Federal oversight of the election administration in Southern states with a history of discriminating against blacks in the election process. Those Southern states could not make changes to the voting process without approval from the , a process known as preclearance.

The Fifteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution establishes the rights of citizens to vote, it reads:
“The right of citizens of the United States shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.�
With the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, Section 2 echoes the language of the 15th Amendment as it bans any “standard, practice, or procedure� that “results in the denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen…to vote on account of race or color.� 42 U. S. C. §1973(a).
In 1970, Congress reauthorized the Act for another five years, and extended the coverage formula in §4(b) to jurisdictions that had a voting test and less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout as of 1968. Congress also amended the definition of “test or device� to include the practice of providing English-only voting materials in places where over five percent of voting-age citizens spoke a single language other than English.

Section 4 and 5 of the Act were recently challenged in v. Holder, Attorney General, et al. and argued before the . Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act “freezes election practices or procedures in certain states until the new procedures have been subjected to review, either after an administrative review by the United States Attorney General, or after a lawsuit before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.� This meant Southern states voting processes that historically discriminated against Black voters were analyzed in accordance with Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act. Section 4, used a “coverage formula� that identified these Southern states known as a “covered jurisdiction� and subjected them to preclearance by the United States Department of Justice prior to making any changes to its voting processes.

Further as the Hispanic population grew in some “covered jurisdictions� Section 5 was later amended to forbid “voting changes with any discriminatory purpose as well as voting changes that diminish the ability of citizens, on account of race, color, or language minority status, to elect their preferred candidates of choice.�

The petitioner, Shelby County in the “covered jurisdiction� State of Alabama, challenged the coverage formula and preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act by filing a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Shelby County argued that Sections 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act were no longer necessary as times have changed since President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Act in 1965, besides Blacks are no longer blatantly barred from the election process.

The Court ruled in favor of Shelby County declaring Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional. This ruling allows the Southern states to make changes in their voting processes such as requiring valid government identification from voters, redistricting voting districts all without preclearance from the United States Department of Justice.

There are certain to be lawsuits challenging individual states voting processes especially those are deemed to be detrimental to African-American and Hispanic voters.

If your voting rights are being violated contact ¸£Àû¼§. in New York. We will review your claims thoroughly, providing you with an outline of possible actions you may wish to take. We are ready to be your voice for justice.

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The federal laws of do not prohibit . Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees freedom of life and property as well as equal protection of laws to the citizens. The Amendment reads: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without ; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.�

However, a few States in the past have enacted (Anti-Miscegenation) statutes prohibiting interracial marriages between Americans and Black Americans. One such State that prohibited interracial marriages was the A landmark case decided in the State of Virginia, then subsequently resolved by the on appeal is , 388 U.S. 1 (1967).

In this case a Black woman and White man were married in the District of Columbia, then returned to Virginia and declared their marriage. But, Virginia had enacted a statute prohibiting interracial marriages between Whites and Blacks. The Loving couple were criminally prosecuted for having an interracial marriage, convicted of a felony and sentenced to one year in jail. The trial court suspended the sentence but, banned the Loving’s from entering Virginia for a period of twenty-five years.

It is interesting to note the tenor and tone of the Court’s ruling. The trial judge opined that:

“Almighty God created the races White, Black, Yellow, Malay and Red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.� Wow…
Further, under Virginia code the punishment for interracial marriage read: “If any intermarry with a Colored Person, or any Colored Person intermarry with a White person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor more than five years.�

Not surprisingly, in many cases Blacks were severely punished for interracial marriages and less punishment was given to Whites. Even under this statute, Whites fared much better than Blacks. The application of the Virginia code is historically consistent in terms of Blacks natural rights being given short shrift since 60 U.S. 393 (1857).

The matter of Loving couple was later appealed to the United States Supreme Court and the court held that prevention or prohibition of interracial marriages violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The court further observed that freedom to marry is an important personal right of an individual. It is one of the basic civil rights. Therefore, States cannot curtail such right by enacting laws violating the Fourteenth Amendment.

If you believe that, your civil rights, due process rights or equal protection rights are violated contact ¸£Àû¼§. in New York. We will review your claim thoroughly, providing you with an outline of possible actions you may wish to take. We are ready to be your voice for justice.

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It is a constitutional right of every accused person to have a fair criminal trial of accusations filed against him. Many accused persons are convicted due to lack of a fair trial. An individual has a right to be represented by counsel of his or her choice in both civil and criminal cases unless the accused or the defendant expresses to his or her constitutional right to appear for his or herself. Historically, persons who could not afford the fees of legal counsel were tried without any representation. This resulted in an unfair advantage over the accused. Today, courts consider such trials as patently unfair. The landmark case the changed the Court’s view is , 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

In this case, was unable to afford the fees of legal counsel to represent him before the Florida . He requested that the court appoint him legal counsel. The court denied the request stating that under State laws the court is allowed to appoint a counsel only in cases of capital offenses. Gideon had no other choice but to defend himself in court. Since he was a layperson, his defense was not very effective. Gideon was subsequently convicted and imprisoned. He filed for writ of habeas corpus before the stating that his conviction was in violation of the . The State Supreme Court denied habeas corpus to him. Gideon subsequently appealed his conviction to the .

The United States Supreme Court reversed the order of lower courts. The Court ruled that the right to be heard includes the right of an accused to be assisted by legal counsel. The Court’s ruling referenced sections of the , which reads:

“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.�

Further, the Court ruled that the right of an accused to be assisted by legal counsel is a fundamental right guaranteed by . Hence, depriving the accused the right to assisted by legal counsel is depriving him of his life and liberty guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, such violation deprives the accused his .

Moreover, the Court rejected the reasoning of the lower court that the court can appoint legal counsel only in capital offenses. The Court ruled that since the right of the accused to be heard is a fundamental right, the same shall be applicable to all cases. The United States Constitution does not make any distinction between capital and non-capital offenses. While deciding this matter the Court considered that the accused is a layman who is not familiar with legal proceedings and will require legal assistance from counsel at every step of the proceeding. Therefore, legal assistance was mandatory to ensure that Gideon receives a fair criminal trial.

If you are facing a criminal trial contact ¸£Àû¼§. in New York. We will review your criminal charges thoroughly, providing you with an outline of possible actions you may wish to take. We are ready to be your voice for justice.

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Freedom of Association refers to the right to join others or become a member of an organization united for a legal common cause or purpose without interference. Although the right to associate is not an independent constitutional right it originates from and contingent on the First Amendment guarantees of free speech and expression.

One early case to recognize the freedom of association was in the , , 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In this case, the a non-profit membership corporation organized under the laws opened an office in the in violation of state statute that required a foreign corporation to “qualify before doing business in the State by filing its corporate charter and designating a place of business and an agent to receive service of process.�

The State brought an equity suit in state court alleging that the NAACP activities was causing “irreparable injury to the citizens of the State for which criminal prosecution and civil actions at law afforded no adequate relief� and sought to prohibit the NAACP from conducting activities and to have them ousted from the State. The court issued an ex parte order restraining the NAACP from engaging in further activities and forbid the organization from operating in the state. The NAACP moved to dissolve the restraining order contending that its activities did not subject it to the qualification requirements of the statute and what the State sought to accomplish by its suit would violate its rights to freedom of speech and assembly guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. On the State’s motion, the court ordered the production of membership records along with other records of the organization and the NAACP eventually produced the requested records except for the membership list whereas they were found in contempt of court and fined $10,000. The denied certiorari to review the contempt judgment but was granted it by the U.S. Supreme Court to decide whether or not Alabama’s requirement of the membership list violate the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that in disclosing the NAACP membership lists it would reveal the identity of the members and based on previous occasions these revelations would expose those members “to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility� and if the NAACP were compelled to disclose its members list it would be an effective curtailing on members freedom of association as well as adversely affect the organization’s ability express their own views.

The Court further opined that the “freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the , which embraces freedom of speech.â€� As stated previously stated, freedom of association is not a right as enumerated in the but this landmark case firmly establishes that freedom of association is tied to freedom of speech.

If you believe that, your freedom to associate or were violated, contact ¸£Àû¼§. in New York at 1-800-371-4835. We will review your claim thoroughly, providing you with an outline of possible actions you may wish to take. We are ready to be your voice for justice.

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